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As the final part of its first volume Theory & Psychology published a special issue 
entitled Cognitivism and its Discontents.  In the same year – 1991– Still and Costall’s 
collection of papers Against Cognitivism appeared.  One of the interesting things was the 
unfamiliarity of the name ‘cognitivism’.  In the thirty years since behaviourists released their 
rats back to the wild there had been cognitive psychology, cognitive science and social 
cognition.  But from the inside of these disciplines they did not seem to have edges.  It 
seemed like the distortions and rules of behaviourism had given way to a sensible and open 
minded focus on psychology as it should be, placing the person with all her rich psyche full 
of thoughts, memories, knowledge and attitudes at the centre of it.  It didn’t seem like there 
was a perspective, a paradigm, so much as the freedom to do proper psychology. 
What was – is – disconcerting about the term cognitivism was its suggestion of 
boundaries.  If there was a cognitivism, in the same way that there was a behaviourism, then 
there could be psychology outside of it and, even worse, cognitivism could be superseded.  
Something could come next.  There could be a post-cognitivist psychology, or even a range 
of post-cognitivist psychologies.  This seemed far-fetched in 1991 but right here in 1999 it 
seems much less so.  Now is an occasion for risking big thoughts about what comes next. 
 
Renewal from the outside 
 
The last fifty years of psychology has been a history of renewal from the outside.  
Information theory, Chomskyan linguistics, ethology, neuroscience, computational theories, 
have all provided novel models for psychological thinking.  Will post-cognitive renewal 
come from the outside?  I believe that it will; indeed, it is.  Let me take two candidate 
thinkers out of range of possible ones: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Harvey Sacks, and use them 
as shorthand for traditions of work. 
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Wittgenstein is commonly recognized as providing the most profound and 
sophisticated critique of Cartesian models of thinking and acting.  His attack on the notion of 
a private world of mental objects correlated with a public lexicon of mental terms, coupled 
with his emphasis on language as a set of practices with their own criteria and logic, offered – 
for those with sufficient imagination – a vision of a very different psychology, certainly a 
non-cognitive psychology.  Yet even where they have been aware of Wittgenstein’s work, 
psychologists have typically been nonplussed as to how it might engage with the specifics of 
research practice and psychological theory.   And it is striking that it has been the 
Wittgenstein influenced ideas of Austin, Searle and Grice that have proved more directly 
attractive to psychologists, probably because of their cognitivist elements and their promise 
of systematization.   
While most psychologists have at least heard of Wittgenstein, Sacks has failed to 
leave serious ripples on the surface of psychology’s consciousness.  His major influence has 
been through the discipline of conversation analysis, which has become increasingly 
prominent in sociology and linguistics.  Both thinkers had their primary effect initially via 
their lecture notes, which have subsequently been published, and both had their major 
influence through works published after their death (Sacks, 1992; Wittgenstein, 1953).  There 
are further important parallels.  Both thinkers give a crucial role to language; both stress that 
its role is fundamentally practical; and both develop their intellectual projects by way of a 
collage of cases and examples rather than providing a core theory.   
They differ, of course, in the rhetorical arenas they worked in and the positions they 
struggled against.  While Wittgenstein was attacking the dualist approach to truth and 
certainty and issues in philosophy of mind through what came to be known as conceptual 
analysis, Sacks attacked the individual/social dualism of sociology and used detailed studies 
of conversation to provide a radical approach to questions of action and social order.  At first 
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conversation analysis does not seem have much to do with the central concerns of 
cognitivism.  However, Derek Edwards (who contributed to the 1991 Theory and Psychology 
issue on cognitivism) has drawn out the implications of Sacks’ thinking for cognitivism 
(Edwards, 1997; see also, Edwards, 1995).   
Edwards’ major work provides a sweeping reappraisal of the central thesaurus of 
cognitivist notions, including shared knowledge, scripts, categories, memory, emotion and 
animal and child cognition.  Its vision is no less than a full-scale discursive psychology.  For 
example, he takes the cognitivist construction of scripts and shows the virtue – analytically 
and theoretically – of respecifying it in terms of practical, situated accomplishments in 
interaction; that is, of script formulations.  Put another way, the orderliness (or not) of action 
and interaction is accomplished as such in interaction and for interaction.  Rather than scripts 
existing in a cognitive mental space to drive action from above, if they exist at all they are an 
inseparable part of the action, involved in the practical and moral world of accountability.  
And he highlights the confused state of traditional research that has made judgements about 
the role of scripts from a range of experimental work without addressing the pragmatics of 
interaction.  This book presents a mature vision of a post-cognitive psychology. 
 
A psychology of practices 
 
Another consequence of understanding psychology in terms of a prevalent 
cognitivism is that it encourages us to view the way method and theory are bound together.  
Whatever the shortcomings of Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific development his 
observation of the way method and theory are bound together in periods of orthodox science 
is a telling one.  One of the features of cognitivism is that by making cognitive processes and 
entities primary, and coupling that with experimental methods, it leads researchers away from 
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the sorts of practices which people are taking part in with each other and to another realm 
entirely.   
It is precisely the downgrading of practices in cognitivist theory that leads to them 
being overwhelmingly ignored in research.  This is epitomised in Chomsky’s discussion of 
competence and performance in linguistics.  It is the (underlying) competence that is taken to 
be the proper topic for study, while the (surface) performance is treated as impossibly messy 
and anyway rather secondary.  Cognitivism has been organized around a metaphorical 
structure of this kind for at least three decades.   
Let me be clear here.  I am not, of course, suggesting that psychologists have had no 
interest in what people do, or in applied or practical questions.  Psychologists spend much of 
their time justifying their activities as relevant to these things.  What I am suggesting is that 
cognitivist assumptions that are so deeply wired into the discipline lead them away from 
taking practices seriously.  What happens is that they are either modelled theoretically and 
the models guide experiments; or they are accessed via participant’s reports in 
questionnaires, surveys, and interviews; or, where some record of practice does enter the 
research process (via a tape or transcript) it is counted and coded using some form of content 
analysis (or, at best, grounded theory) designed to recover the background factors or themes.   
The point, and it is a subtle but crucial one, is that psychologists have not dealt with 
practices in a manner that does justice to their status as practices.  That is, they have 
overwhelmingly failed to attend to the way practices are oriented to action, are situated and 
co-constructed in stretches of interaction, and are given sense through the categories, 
formulations, and orientation of participants.  It is this latter point, in particular, which fatally 
impoverished the few attempts by behaviourists to study action (reducing it to behaviour as 
they did so) in natural settings (consider Barker, 1968, for example).   
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It is perhaps notable that, as psychologists have tentatively started to employ 
qualitative methods in the 1990s, open-ended interviews and grounded theory have been the 
most popular approaches.  Open-ended interviews encourage the search for some pre-
existing, cognitively represented resources.  Few studies have successfully accommodated to 
what is going in terms of specific interview practices, with all that implies (Widdicombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995, is a rare exception).  Grounded theory elaborates the counting and coding 
operations of content analysis that cut across the situated and action oriented nature of 
people’s practices.  In contrast, very few pieces of psychological research have used 
ethnographic methods, despite its long establishment and success in sociology and 
anthropology.  My point is that cognitivism as a set of assumptions is very deeply layered in 
the discipline, and merely to take up new methods which lead outside the walls of the 
cognition lab does not in itself guarantee that these assumptions disappear.   
 
Discursive psychology as post-cognitivism 
 
I do not believe that there will be, or should be, one successor to cognitivism.  A 
number of the new visions that have been developed in the pages of Theory & Psychology 
have important virtues and exciting implications.  I do not even believe that cognitivism 
should be closed down in its entirety – it grapples with some interesting and challenging 
questions, some of which would hard to address from different perspectives.  However, one 
of the aims of the kind of discursive psychology developed in Edwards’ Discourse and 
Cognition is precisely to get beyond some of these theoretical and methodological problems.  
He draws on sociology of science to help grapple with the profound (but typically ignored) 
epistemological problems that arise doing research on people’s practices, and on conversation 
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analysis which is arguably the most sophisticated approach yet to interaction currently 
available.   
One of the consequences of taking a discursive rather than a cognitive approach is that 
it provides a principled, theoretically grounded reason for addressing topics that 
psychologists used to deal with in exclusively cognitivist terms by focusing on action.  Rather 
than concentrating on putative inner entities and processes that might be occurring within an 
actor abstracted from action and interaction, the interest is in how cognitive notions are 
constructed, managed and oriented to in action.  Discursive psychologists ask: what does the 
‘memory’ do in some interaction?  How is a version of the past constructed to sustain some 
action?  Or: what is an ‘attitude’ used to do?  How is an evaluation built to assign blame to a 
minority group, say, or how is an evaluation used to persuade a reluctant adolescent to eat 
tuna pasta (Potter, 1998).  The prevailing routine of cognitivism involves abstracting the 
person from interaction as far as possible.  In discursive psychology, interaction becomes a, 
perhaps the, fundamental site for studying (a respecified) cognition.   
A feature of this focus on practices is that it leads to, indeed probably requires, a 
counterintuitive inversion.  In traditional cognitivism there is reality, on the one hand, that is 
the setting – the ‘stimulus conditions’ that enclose actors – and there is cognition, on the 
other, something existing and quietly computing inside the actors.  Activity (and in 
cognitivism this is still typically assumed to be the same thing as behaviour) is treated as 
something secondary; it is treated as the output of the system.  In discursive psychology this 
is inverted, activity is treated as primary and reality and cognition are treated as secondary.  
That is, the focus is on what people are doing, and how, in the course of their practices they 
produce versions of reality and of cognition.  They describe the world, formulating 
particulars that are relevant, providing its moral flavour and highlighting its causal power; 
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and they describe cognition, formulating an inner life of beliefs, motives and feelings that 
make their actions accountable. 
Why is this inversion required?  It is necessary if we are going to study activity rather 
than behaviour.  Activity is inextricable from the categories, formulations and orientations or 
the actors.  When the researcher categorizes the setting, say, in some way independently of 
participants’ categorizations and orientations, they are moving away from an analysis of 
action.  They are ceasing to take participants seriously and they are drifting into a potential 
methodological mess.  Cognitivists are so used to pre-defining the world – in stimulus 
materials, in vignettes, in fixed choice questionnaires – that they never had to address the 
flexibility and rhetorically contested nature of everyday life where the world is not given in a 
single particular way, in particular fixed categories, but is re-accomplished and transformed.  
The mess is relatively invisible from within the standard cognitivist framework because its 
familiar methods break up the occasioned and action oriented nature of participants’ practices 
as well as predefining input and output.  There are hardly any methodological cracks through 
which participants constructions and orientations can seep out.  
In many ways the disputes about softness and rigour, the imposition of hypothetico 
deductivism from an imaginary version of physics, and so on, are beside the point.  If your 
entire methodological system imposes a systematic artefact on the research outcome it is hard 
to sustain it as good science or empiricism.   And, ironically, but importantly, while this 
methodological inversion to make situated practices primary seems initially to reduce 
psychology, a close attention to those practices brings in much more than was there before.  It 
brings in history, culture, a wide range of realities, and a huge population of psychological 
entities and processes. 
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A new century of psychology 
 
My main suggestion, then, is this.  Whatever else it does in the new century 
psychology should start to study what people do.  That is, psychologists should take up the 
legacy of Sacks and Wittgenstein and should research people’s situated practices.  It is a topic 
that is huge and varied – as the pattern of Sacks’ and Wittgenstein’s work hints.  This will 
undoubtedly sound like an odd suggestion after a hundred and twenty odd years of university 
psychology.  What have psychologists been doing all that time?  Mostly, I would suggest, 
avoiding the study of practices and using other methods to pursue a neat Chomskyan realm of 
underlying processes and entities. 
What will this research on practices look like?  High quality work is already starting 
to paint in the detail of this vision. Take the example of ‘visual perception’, which is surely a 
hard case for post-cognitive psychology.  In a series of studies, Charles and Marjorie 
Goodwin have shown how perception can be treated not as an inner psychological 
phenomenon, but as a feature of situated practices where airline workers, chemists and 
oceanographers have to ‘see’ particular planes, colour changes in reactions, or features of the 
ocean floor (Goodwin, 1995, 1997; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996, 1997).  These studies start to 
show how ‘perception’, whatever is biological underpinning, is also a concept of what people 
do that is produced interaction.  They look at practices of looking and seeing, and draw on 
skills in conversation analysis and anthropology to make telling new observations about the 
practices of chemistry, and legal arguments about police violence. 
It is exciting that despite the quantity of psychological research that has already been 
produced virtually all of the work is still to be done. 
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